Research on the impact of subsidization on the airline networks of multi-airport systems based on dynamic game theory

Abstract:

To discuss the influence of different subsidy modes on the airline networks of multi-airport systems, this paper constructs a dynamic game model between airports, airlines, and passengers.The Nash equilibrium is obtained by analyzing the payoff matrix.The result shows: (1) Different subsidy modes have an important impact on the multi-airport airline network, and the low subsidy promotes the multi-airport system to form a point-to-point network; on the contrary, in the high subsidy mode, the multi-airport system is easy to form a hub-spoke network.(2) If the total operating costs of air-HSR cooperation are relatively low, subsidy competition makes carriers choose large airports in the system as the hub; conversely, if the total operating costs of air-HSR cooperation are relatively high, subsidy competition makes carriers choose small airports as the hub.(3) With the increase in fixed flight costs and total operating costs of air-HSR cooperation, the probability of large airports as hub nodes will gradually decrease, while the probability of small airports being selected as hub nodes will gradually increase.At the same time, as the proportion of the population in large airports increases, the probability of carriers choosing a point-to-point network decreases.The research conclusions can provide a decision-making basis for the industry management department to scientifically formulate and apply the route subsidy policy.